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BRANNON P. DENNING*
ABSTRACT
In a recent article, Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David Pozen iden-
tified “uncivil obedience” as a tactic for protesting laws or regula-
tions, not by violating the law, as with civil disobedience, but rather
by scrupulous attendance to it. They noted that it is a tactic available
to private and public actors alike, but were doubtful that a judicial
variety existed. They were skeptical because, in their opinion, even
hyper-formalist legal opinions would be unlikely to be perceived as
provocative as scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law might be
when practiced by non-judicial actors. In this Article, I argue that
judicial uncivil obedience is possible, discuss examples of lower court
uncivil obedience to United States Supreme Court decisions,
speculate why uncivil obedience might be a particularly attractive
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form of dissent by inferior courts in a hierarchical judicial system,
and argue that my examples satisfy Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s cri-
teria. In addition, I argue that the constraints on uncivil obedience
identified by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen, which can limit the opportu-
nity for its exercise, have analogues that likewise limit the ability of
judges to engage in uncivil obedience.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are a lower court judge who thinks that a recent
Supreme Court decision would produce a number of undesirable
consequences if its reasoning were pushed to its logical limits. Your
response might be to read the decision narrowly, perhaps nearly
confining it to its facts until clear signals are sent from the Court
that it is serious. That has tended to be lower courts’—especially
courts of appeals’—response to salient, potentially broad and deep
decisions like United States v. Lopez.1
In other words, you might react just as Fourth Circuit Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III reacted to District of Columbia v. Heller.2
Judge Wilkinson was an early critic of Heller, not only criticizing the
Court’s opinion,3 but also predicting that lower courts would face a
rash of suits that would force them to fill in the gaps in the Court’s
decision.4 As a sitting judge, Wilkinson has warned his colleagues
to say no more than necessary when applying Heller.5
Another tactic, however, would be to ignore any limiting signals
furnished by the Court and apply its decision in a way that takes its
logic, and the principles it seems to announce, at face value. You
could, then, do what Judge Richard Posner—a vociferous critic of
1. See generally 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For examples of early post-Lopez decisions narrowly
reading the case, see Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of
Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 369, 379, 397-98.
2. See generally 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule
of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009).
4. See id. at 280. He wrote:
The Court has invited future challenges by not defining the scope of the right to
bear arms, by not providing a standard of review for firearms regulation, and by
creating a list of exceptions to the newfound personal Second Amendment right.
The cases filed since Heller and the multitude of federal, state, and municipal
gun control regulations threaten to suck the courts into a quagmire.
Id.
5. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“There simply
is no need in this litigation to break ground that our superiors have not tread. To the degree
that we push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in Heller declared to be its origin, we
circumscribe the scope of popular governance, move the action into court, and encourage
litigation in contexts we cannot foresee.”); see also United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 124
(4th Cir. 2012) (refusing to speculate on the degree to which Heller applies outside the home).
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Heller himself—did when he wrote a decision extending Heller’s
holding by ruling that Illinois’s total ban on the concealed carrying
of weapons was unconstitutional.6 The logic of Heller, Judge Posner
argued, could not be confined to the possession of weapons in the
home.7 The reasoning employed by the Court, he argued, mandated
that the right to armed self-defense be accorded to those who exper-
ienced confrontations in public, too.8 It is difficult to imagine Judge
Wilkinson joining such an opinion, much less writing it.
One might chalk up the differences in the treatment of Heller by
Judges Posner and Wilkinson to the discretion that lower courts use
when implementing Supreme Court decisions. Scholars continue to
undermine the traditional hierarchical view of federal courts,
wherein the Supreme Court issues decisions that lower courts duti-
fully and faithfully implement.9 Recent scholarship has highlighted
numerous ways in which lower courts possess and exercise discre-
tion when it comes to interpreting and applying those decisions.10 In
particular areas, it appears that lower courts read potentially far-
reaching decisions narrowly, with an eye to limiting their impact.11
Given the almost negligible chance of the Court granting certiorari
in and reversing any one case, lower courts—appeals courts in
particular—have significant amounts of discretion to exercise with
something approaching impunity.12 A recent article by Richard Re,
for example, argues that “lower courts have a substantial interpre-
tative gray zone available to them” in which they may “legitimately
narrow Supreme Court precedent by adopting a reasonable reading
6. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012); see also infra notes 191-204
and accompanying text.
7. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935-38.
8. See id.
9. For a succinct expression of this sentiment, see HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 10 (1912). Black wrote
that:
Inferior courts are absolutely bound to follow the decisions of the courts having
appellate ... jurisdiction over them. In this aspect, precedents set by the higher
courts are imperative in the strictest sense. They are conclusive on the lower
courts, and leave to the latter no scope for independent judgment or discretion.
Id.
10. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 417 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 1, at 392, 397-98.
12. See Kim, supra note 10, at 397-98 (noting that the chance of district courts and courts
of appeal being reversed by the Supreme Court is very small).
2018] CAN JUDGES BE UNCIVILLY OBEDIENT? 7
of it.”13 Lower courts may even engage in “partial overruling,” which
“occurs when a court accepts that a precedent already covers the
relevant legal terrain but then trumps the precedent in whole or in
part by establishing a new legal rule.”14
Neil Siegel recently highlighted how lower courts and the Su-
preme Court can work in tandem to expand constitutional principles
that are tentatively, and perhaps narrowly, enunciated by the
Court.15 In what he terms “reciprocal legitimation,” the lower courts
extend Supreme Court decisions, and the Court then ratifies those
extensions in a later opinion.16 In a recent example of the phenome-
non, Siegel argues that Obergefell v. Hodges17 was made possible
after lower courts took up the Court’s invitation in United States v.
Windsor18 to use Windsor’s due process and equal protection analy-
sis to strike down state same-sex marriage bans.19 The Court then
ratified the lower courts’ analyses in Obergefell.20 He argued that
the Court in Obergefell “seemed to be trying to legitimate its con-
troversial conclusion in part by portraying federal court decisions
concerning same-sex marriage as if they were entirely independent
of its decision in Windsor, when in all likelihood they were not.”21
In this Article, I seek to add to this literature by exploring the
possibility that lower courts can also press the logic of Supreme
Court opinions to their limits, applying them in potentially far-
reaching and disruptive ways with a view to critiquing them and
perhaps affecting the future direction of Supreme Court doctrine.22
13. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921,
925, 927 (2016).
14. Id. at 926.
15. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1186 (2017).
16. Id. (“[D]istrict and circuit courts seek to legitimate their decisions by relying upon an
initial Supreme Court decision ... as authority for expanding the scope of the decision, and the
Supreme Court in a later decision ... seeks to blunt threats to its own legitimacy by invoking
those district and circuit court decisions as authority for validating the expansion.”).
17. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
18. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
19. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 1185 (arguing that “Windsor seemed tailor-made to gener-
ating a lopsided circuit split in favor of same-sex marriage”).
20. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2608-10.
21. Siegel, supra note 15, at 1185.
22. An early version of this paper labeled attempts to get the Court to trim early
pronouncements as “bluff calling” opinions, while opinions that liked the direction in which
the Court was headed and wanted to see those Court opinions reaffirmed and even expanded,
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I further argue that when courts do so, they are engaging in a form
of what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David Pozen termed “uncivil
obedience.”23 As they define it, “uncivil obedience” is:
[A] deliberate, normatively motivated act or coordinated set of
acts ... that communicates criticism of a law or policy ... with a
significant purpose of changing or disrupting that law or policy
... in conformity with all applicable positive law ... in a manner
that calls attention to its own formal legality, while departing
from prevailing expectations about how the law will be followed
or applied.24
While uncivil obedience takes many forms and can be undertaken
by a variety of public and private actors, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen
are skeptical that a judicial variety exists.25 I argue here that it does
and that Bulman-Pozen and Pozen were too quick to dismiss the
possibility that uncivil obedience is a tactic available to lower court
judges. Potential examples, I argue, are found in lower court appli-
cations of recent landmark Supreme Court decisions.26
Part I briefly describes Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s theory of un-
civil obedience, its criteria, limits on its exercise, and why they
doubt that judges could be true uncivil obedients. Part II then offers
several examples of lower court opinions that, I argue in Part III,
satisfy Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s criteria for uncivil obedience.
While lower courts often engage in uncivil obedience in order to
force the Supreme Court to limit prior, potentially far-reaching
decisions, it is also possible that courts do so seeking to expand the
“spine-stiffening” opinions. I gave those up because it seemed that proving an opinion was one
or the other would be very difficult, requiring as it would insight into the mind of the judges
in the majority.
23. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 820-21 (2015). A recently published student note takes a wide-angle approach and
suggests that uncivil obedience is an example within a broader category of what the author
calls “compliant subversion,” where actors comply with the letter of the law, but in a way that
actually subverts its spirit. See Jacob Hutt, Note, Compliant Subversion, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1609, 1614 (2017). Michael Kent and I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court often
responds to attempts to subvert the spirit of its decisions by creating what we call “anti-
evasion doctrines.” Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in
Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1779.
24. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 820.
25. See id. at 833-34.
26. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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scope of an earlier decision whose reach or effect on prior cases is
unclear but whose principle is one with which the majority is in
sympathy. In either case, the lower courts are engaged in a critique
of present or past Supreme Court doctrine. Part III also offers rea-
sons why uncivil obedience might be particularly appealing to lower
court judges, as well as why the technique is not more commonly
employed by lower courts. A brief conclusion follows.27
I. UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE IN A NUTSHELL
This Part summarizes Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s theory of unciv-
il obedience.28 In addition to its definition and a summary of its cri-
teria, I highlight why they are skeptical that judges can be uncivilly
obedient.
A. Uncivil Obedience in Theory and Practice
Intentionally violating a law to bring attention to the law’s
immorality or injustice and produce change, what is commonly re-
ferred to as “civil disobedience,” is a familiar technique of activists.29
And yet, there is some feeling that civil disobedience is becoming
“increasingly irrelevant” because “guarantees of fundamental free-
doms and equal treatment have been extended to more and more
members of the world’s democracies.”30 Uncivil obedience, how-
ever—civil disobedience’s “legalistic doppleganger”—is, Bulman-
Pozen and Pozen argue, an increasingly commonplace and popular
27. One other caveat: the examples I use here are drawn from constitutional law because
it is the body of law with which I am most familiar. I would guess that other examples can be
found in areas of statutory interpretation or instances when federal courts must apply state
law.
28. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23.
29. Bulman-Pozen and Pozen define civil disobedience as follows:
A pared-down definition of civil disobedience, limited to elements that have at-
tained near-universal agreement among theorists, might be the following: “a
conscientious and communicative breach of law designed to demonstrate con-
demnation of a law or policy and to contribute to a change in that law or policy.”
Beyond these elements, one might further require that the breach be nonviolent
and undertaken with a willingness to accept the legal consequences. These nar-
rowing features are disputed.
Id. at 812 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 871.
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factor in American politics.31 From the generally accepted elements
of civil disobedience—conscientiousness, communicativeness, re-
formist intent, illegality, and legal provocation32—they construct the
definition of uncivil obedience quoted in the Introduction.33 Instead
of defiance of a law in order to draw attention to its injustice, at the
heart of uncivil obedience is private or public actors’ unstinting and
to-the-letter compliance with the law.34 Yet the motive is the same
in both: critiquing the status quo with a view towards reform.
Examples abound. One Bulman-Pozen and Pozen offer is a 1993
incident in which a group of California motorists drove precisely
fifty-five miles an hour on the freeway in an attempt to challenge
the fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit.35 Another example is that
of employees “[w]orking to rule”: “do[ing] exactly what they are told
to do, adher[ing] exactly to safety protocols, or report[ing] to and
depart[ing] from the premises exactly on time.”36 Bulman-Pozen and
Pozen also cite as examples public defenders who insist on jury
trials for all of their clients,37 Teddy Roosevelt strictly enforcing
Sunday-closure laws for saloons while serving as New York police
commissioner,38 the Obama Administration’s use of the “big waiver”
in the No Child Left Behind Act to counter Congress’s failure to
amend the Act,39 and Arizona’s immigration law that incorporated
federal law.40
B. The Criteria for Uncivil Obedience
Mirroring the elements of civil disobedience, Bulman-Pozen and
Pozen specify five criteria for uncivil obedience: (1) conscientious-
31. Id. at 871-72.
32. Id. at 820.
33. See supra text accompanying note 24; see also Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23,
at 820.
34. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 811.
35. See id. at 810.
36. Id. at 818. The example they give is of American Airlines pilots filing “incessant—and
technically mandatory—maintenance requests” after negotiations broke down between the
airline and the pilots’ union. Id. at 818-19.
37. See id. at 830-31.
38. See id. at 831.
39. See id. at 833. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big
Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013).
40. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 839.
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ness; (2) communicativeness; (3) reformist intent; (4) legality; and
(5) legal provocation.41 Their article defines each element in turn.
1. Conscientiousness
In order to be “conscientious,” they argue that “the act [must] be
subjectively serious, calculated, and grounded in sincere conviction.
It does not require that the act be morally attractive or guided by
fundamental principles of justice.”42 It need not be “devoid of self-
interest” but it needs to be “rooted in genuine belief about right and
wrong and ... [be] deployed to achieve lasting reform.”43
2. Communicativeness
As they define it, communicativeness “requires that the act con-
vey disapproval of a law or policy.”44 The message “may be conveyed
performatively, through the act itself, or it may be conveyed verbal-
ly, through commentary about the act.”45 While “contemporaneous
publicity” of the existance and intended significance of the uncivil
obedience is necessary, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen are careful to
point out that one engaging in uncivil obedience need not be candid
about so doing.46
3. Reformist Intent
Reformist intent, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen write, “requires that
the actor not only convey disapproval of some law or policy but also
aspire to reshape it in an enduring manner.”47 Within this element,
they further distinguish “direct” uncivil obedience—seeking “change
[in] the law or policy with which [the protester] is conspicuously
41. See id. at 820.
42. Id. at 821.
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 822.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing an example of employees who “may claim that they are ‘just’ looking out for
workplace safety ... but their actions may disclose a distinct critical agenda concerning labor
relations”).
47. Id. 
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complying”—from “indirect” uncivil obedience, where one law or pol-
icy is used to challenge another.48
Further, the reform can be explicit (the drivers who clogged the
Los Angeles freeway with scrupulous observance of the speed limit
sought congressional repeal of the fifty-five mile per hour limit) or,
alternatively, “uncivil obedients may aim to reshape the ‘law in ac-
tion,’ without necessarily revising the law on the books.”49 Indirect
uncivil obedience may occur by “enhanc[ing] the salience of a regula-
tion or highlight[ing] its objectionable nature.”50 Actors can also
“exert pressure more directly by undermining the efficacy or effi-
ciency of a particular law, policy, or institution” by, for example,
highlighting the compliance costs of laws.51
4. Legality
Where civil disobedience and uncivil obedience differ is in their
legality.52 Bulman-Pozen and Pozen explain that “[t]his criterion
requires that authoritative directives be followed rather than
flouted, obeyed rather than disobeyed.”53 One who commits an act
of uncivil obedience must “reasonably and genuinely believe it be
clear that she is violating no positive law or regulation of an ap-
plicable jurisdiction.”54 The action undertaken must not appear to
be prohibited; it is not enough that the actor is unlikely to be caught
or punished, “[t]he uncivil obedient must believe that her behavior
truly conforms to relevant legal norms.”55
5. Legal Provocation
The final element—legal provocation—“requires that the act,
although believed to be lawful, strike others as jarring or subver-
sive—and strike others as jarring or subversive at least in part
48. See id. at 822-23.
49. Id. at 823 (footnote omitted).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 823-24.
52. See id. at 824.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. Therefore, “evasion” will not count, nor will bringing a test case insofar as the
latter “reflects significant doubt about the conduct’s lawfulness.” See id.
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because of its very attentiveness to law.”56 Put another way, the ac-
tor’s use of an “authoritative directive” must be provocative because
of the act’s “uncommon disregard for principles of custom and
moderation, even as it clings to formal legality.”57
C. Skepticism About Judicial Uncivil Obedience
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen observe that uncivil obedience is avail-
able to public actors58 (recall Teddy Roosevelt’s enforcement of
Sunday closing laws against New York City saloons).59 And yet they
doubt that judges are capable of uncivil obedience. First, they argue,
“judges ... are expected to attend carefully to the letter of the law,”
and so even formalist decisions are unlikely to “come across as an
ironic or inflammatory intervention” because they would be seen as
doing what judges should do—applying the law.60 Second, the endur-
ing image of judge-as-umpire or judge-as-law-discoverer means that
a judge’s ruling is seen as “elaborating the underlying law rather
than changing or challenging it in some reformist fashion.”61
They concede that “hypothetical examples of judges communicat-
ing a reformist intent through subversive attention to legal lan-
guage” might exist; for example, imposing harsh sentences “at the
very top of the guidelines range in order to protest draconian crim-
inal penalties.”62 They further concede that their “categories might
be extended to embrace more judicial behavior,” but nevertheless,
they doubt the “prevalence of judicial uncivil obedience as [they]
have defined the concept.”63
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s example leads me to believe that they
might have had judicial interpretation of statutes or regulations
primarily in mind. In the next Part, though, I will describe lower
court treatment of highly salient, potentially transformative Su-
preme Court decisions that are possible examples of judicial uncivil
obedience. In Part III, moreover, I will make the case that uncivil
56. Id. at 825.
57. Id. at 825-26.
58. See id. at 831.
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 833.
61. Id. at 833-34.
62. Id. at 834.
63. Id.
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obedience, as Bulman-Pozen and Pozen define it, might be particu-
larly attractive to lower court judges and that my examples satisfy
their criteria.
II. LOOKING FOR UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE IN THE LOWER COURTS
In this Part, I offer examples of lower court opinions that appear
to be uncivilly obedient. Specifically, I argue that, in these exam-
ples, lower courts take the Supreme Court’s opinions at face value
and pursue the logic of the opinions to their ends. The results of do-
ing so often highlight the potentially far-reaching effects of these
opinions. The Court is then faced with the choice of adopting the
lower court’s reading, possibly confirming the transformative nature
of its earlier decision,64 or trimming its sails and charting a more
modest doctrinal course. What follows are examples of judicial un-
civil obedience in four areas of constitutional doctrine: (1) the Com-
merce Clause; (2) anti-commandeering; (3) affirmative action; and
(4) the Second Amendment. While I do not claim that these exam-
ples are exhaustive, I do think there are enough that meet Bulman-
Pozen and Pozen’s definition65 to suggest that the phenomenon of
judicial uncivil obedience exists.
A. Possible Examples of Judicial Uncivil Obedience
The examples in each of the four areas proceeded in similar
fashion. First, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that had the po-
tential to cut broad swaths through existing constitutional doctrine.
Second, a court of appeals pressed the logic of the Court’s opinion in
ways that created splits with other courts, forcing the Court to
intervene. Third, in the cases where the Court had the opportunity,
it reversed the lower courts and indicated limits to how far its prior
opinion should be extended.
64. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 15, at 1185.
65. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 820.
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1. The Commerce Clause
United States v. Lopez’s,66 invalidation of the Gun Free School
Zones Act (GFSZA) on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause was met with a mixture of outrage and
incredulity.67 Lopez triggered an avalanche of challenges to a wide
range of federal statutes—mostly from federal defendants convicted
of violating laws enacted under the aegis of the commerce power.68
The overwhelming majority of lower courts reacted to Lopez by read-
ing it very narrowly, using any available means to differentiate
challenged statutes from the GFSZA.69 This “narrowing from be-
low”70 continued even after the Court reaffirmed Lopez in United
States v. Morrison,71 although, following the latter case, a few courts
did hand victories to defendants bringing as-applied challenges to
their federal convictions.72
Three 2003 decisions from the Ninth Circuit—United States v.
McCoy,73 United States v. Stewart,74 and Raich v. Ashcroft75—held
that certain applications of the federal child pornography law, the
federal ban on possession of machine guns, and the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA), respectively, exceeded congressional power under
the Commerce Clause. All did so in especially provocative ways that
prompted dissenting opinions from members of the panels.
66. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
67. For contemporary commentary, see, for example, Tom Stacy, What’s Wrong with
Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 244 (1996); David O. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause,
A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 46 (“For some, Lopez resembled a constitutional Walpurgisnacht,
setting loose precedents that long ago had been consigned to the flames of the auto-da-fé for
discredited cases.”).
68. See generally Reynolds & Denning, supra note 1 (collecting examples).
69. See id. at 371.
70. Re, supra note 13, at 923. 
71. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1262
(2003).
73. 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).
74. 348 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded 545 U.S.
1112 (2005).
75. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub. nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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a. United States v. McCoy
In McCoy, the panel reversed the conviction of a defendant con-
victed of “simple intrastate possession of a visual depiction [of child
pornography].”76 The defendant was indicted for violating federal
child pornography laws when employees at a photo shop discovered
a picture of her and her ten year old daughter with their genitals
exposed.77 As the court noted, the picture had not been “mailed,
shipped, or transported interstate and [was] not intended for inter-
state distribution, or for any economic or commercial use, including
the exchange ... for other prohibited material.”78
In his opinion, the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt applied the
Lopez and Morrison factors and found that several important ele-
ments were lacking.79 First, noting that the possession of the mater-
ial was neither commercial nor economic in nature, he refused to
apply Wickard v. Filburn’s aggregation rule, arguing that Lopez and
Morrison had limited Wickard’s reach.80 He explained that, “[h]ere,
we conclude that simple intrastate possession of home-grown child
pornography not intended for distribution or exchange is ‘not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity.’”81
Judge Reinhardt declined to follow decisions from other circuits
that relied on the aggregation principle to uphold convictions even
for intrastate, noncommercial possession of child pornography.82 He
observed that these decisions rested on “questionable premises”83:
that Congress could have intended to address “demand side forc-
es”;84 that those decisions relied on subsequent legislative history to
76. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1120-24.
80. See id. at 1120 (“In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court carefully limited the
reach of Wickard, while affirming that decision’s continued vitality.”).
81. Id. at 1122-23 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)).
82. See id. at 1121-22; see also United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir.
1999); United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Robinson, 137
F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 1997).
83. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1121.
84. See id. (noting that premise “is based on speculation that Congress could have rea-
soned that purely intrastate possession will ultimately have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, even though it chose not to make any such findings or declarations”).
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assess the intent of an earlier statute;85 and that the possessor of a
single intrastate piece of child pornography is an “addict[ ]-in-
futuro” who must be punished lest she “ultimately enter the
interstate pornography market.”86
The court also rejected the argument that Congress could have
rationally believed regulating the intrastate market was necessary
to regulate the interstate market effectively.87 Finding such argu-
ments too attenuated, the court pointed to the rejection of similar
arguments in Lopez and Morrison, as well as the Supreme Court’s
conclusion that to accept such arguments would be to convert the
Commerce Clause into a “general police power.”88 Judge Reinhardt
added that “[i]t is particularly important that in the field of criminal
law enforcement, where state power is preeminent, national author-
ity be limited to those areas in which interstate commerce is truly
affected.”89
The court further concluded that the statute’s jurisdictional hook,
which covered depictions that had been produced with materials
that themselves had moved in interstate commerce, “fail[ed] totally
to [closely tie the regulated activity to interstate commerce].”90 The
court explained further that “[i]t not only fails to limit the reach of
the statute to any category or categories of cases that have a partic-
ular effect on interstate commerce, but, to the contrary, it encom-
passes virtually every case imaginable, so long as any modern-day
photographic equipment or material has been used.”91
Again declining to follow other lower courts that concluded the
jurisdictional hook saved the statute or its application from invali-
dation, the court flatly held that “the hook at issue here provides no
support for the government’s assertion of federal jurisdiction.”92 To
hold, as other courts had, that the presence of any hook suffices to
85. See id.
86. Id. at 1122 (“We see no more justification for assuming that a possessor of a ‘home-
grown’ photograph of one’s own child will ultimately enter the interstate pornography market
as an addict than there is to assume that the possessor of a single marijuana cigarette will
inevitably turn into a full-time heroin junkie.”).
87. See id. at 1123.
88. See id. at 1123-24.
89. Id. at 1124.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1126.
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insulate the regulated activity from review “would ‘ignore[ ] the fact
that the connection between the activity regulated and the jurisdic-
tional hook may be so attenuated’ that there may be no substantial
effect on interstate commerce.”93
Finally, the court looked at the legislative history and concluded
that while Congress was concerned with the effects of commercial
child pornography on interstate commerce, it did not address intra-
state, noncommercial child pornography.94 To the extent that it
discussed the latter at all, the court noted that the Department of
Justice expressed concerns over the constitutionality of covering
possession of material whose sole connection with interstate com-
merce was that it had been produced with materials that had trav-
eled in interstate or foreign commerce.95
The court held that “nothing in the circumstances of McCoy’s case
establishes any substantial connection between her conduct and
any interstate commercial activity.”96 If she “and others similarly
situated” were to be punished, Judge Reinhardt concluded, it would
have to come at the hands of state, not federal, prosecutors.97
Dissenting, Judge Trott questioned whether an “as applied” chal-
lenge was even available.98 He explained, “I come at this case from
an analytical perspective different from my friends in the major-
ity.”99 Lopez, he argued, foreclosed as-applied challenges endorsed
by the majority.100 He continued: “The reason why I believe the
majority’s approach is not viable is simple: the Supreme Court said
in Lopez that ‘where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual in-
stances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’”101 He
argued that the “de minimis nexus of Rhonda McCoy” was legally ir-
relevant.102 “[I]f the general regulatory statute at issue does bear a
93. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir.
1999)).
94. See id. at 1127.
95. See id. at 1128.
96. Id. at 1132.
97. Id. at 1133.
98. See id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1134.
100. Id. at 1134-35
101. Id. at 1134.
102. Id. at 1135.
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substantial relation to commerce, an ‘as applied’ challenge is inap-
propriate.”103
Judge Trott thought that his colleagues “may have exceeded what
the law permits,” though he did concede that “[t]his case is not free
from doubt, as Judge Reinhardt’s well-articulated opinion con-
cludes.”104 Even so, while “not oblivious to the difference between
wheat and child pornography ... as generic commodities determined
by Congress to be part of a national market, they both are subject
to Commerce Clause regulation. Therefore, the factual noncommer-
cial nature of a single item of the commodity is immaterial.”105
b. United States v. Stewart
Building on McCoy, the Ninth Circuit then nixed the convictions
of two additional defendants whose connections to interstate
commerce the panels found insufficient to sustain federal jurisdic-
tion. In Stewart, the defendant was convicted for possession of a
machine gun in violation of federal law.106 The twist was that the
machine gun in question had been made entirely by the defen-
dant.107 He challenged his conviction, claiming that the application
of the federal machine gun ban violated the Commerce Clause, as
interpreted by Lopez and Morrison.108
After concluding that Stewart had not used the channels of in-
terstate commerce because his machine gun was homemade, the
court addressed whether his possession substantially affected
interstate commerce.109 Applying Morrison, the court concluded that
it did not.110
Mere possession, it observed, was not economic activity, nor did
the ban serve a commercial purpose.111 The court explained, “that
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1140-41.
105. Id. at 1141.
106. See United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1136.
110. See id. at 1140.
111. See id. at 1137. Other circuits have upheld the machine gun ban. See Navegar, Inc.
v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d
90, 93 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United States v. Rybar, 103
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the effect of Stewart’s possession of homemade machineguns on
interstate commerce was attenuated under the fourth prong of the
Morrison test.”112 In addition, as the court read them, Lopez and
Morrison had already rejected the argument that because the cost
of criminal activity is spread through insurance, regulations aimed
at preventing violent crimes have an enormous impact on the
national economy.113 Furthermore, the court also read Lopez and
Morrison to reject the argument that when people are less willing
to travel to unsafe areas of the country, interstate commerce is
significantly affected.114
Those arguments’ causal chains were too attenuated to satisfy the
Supreme Court’s substantial effects test.115 The court observed that
the federal ban had no express element tying the machine gun to
interstate commerce and lacked congressional findings.116
Judge Restani dissented.117 Invoking Wickard, she argued that
“[p]ossession of machine guns, home manufactured or not, substan-
tially interferes with Congress’s long standing attempts to control
the interstate movement of machine guns by proscribing transfer
and possession.”118 Because Congress sought “to totally eliminate
the demand side of the economic activity by freezing legal posses-
sion at 1986 levels, ‘an effect that is closely entwined with regulat-
ing interstate commerce’ even as applied to purely intrastate
possession of machine guns resulting from home manufacture,” she
concluded that “[a]llowing home manufacture [was] clearly not
within the intent of § 922(o) and would upset Congress’s entirely
lawful plan to regulate trade in machine guns.”119
F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 782, 784 (6th Cir.
1996); United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885, 891 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995).
112. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Glenn Reynolds and Dave Kopel dubbed this portion of Lopez and Morrison the “non-
infinity principle.” See David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously:
Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1997).
116. See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1138.
117. See id. at 1142 (Restani, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 1143.
119. Id.
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c. Raich v. Ashcroft
A month after Stewart, Judge Pregerson, writing for another
divided panel, sustained an as-applied challenge to prosecutions
under the Controlled Substances Act.120 The case involved local,
noncommercial production and possession of marijuana by defen-
dants who were using it for medicinal purposes as permitted by
California law.121
After first defining the relevant class of activities “as the intra-
state, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana
for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in
accordance with state law,” the majority concluded that there was
no economic activity being regulated.122 Therefore, the court did not
apply the “aggregation” principle because “the regulated activity in
this case [was] not commercial.”123 The court noted the absence of
the “jurisdictional hook” in the CSA124 and concluded that the con-
gressional findings—while present—did not address the class of
120. See generally Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
121. See id. at 1224. Compare id., with United States v. Sprofera, 299 F.3d 725, 727-28 (8th
Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenge to federal drug statutes), United States v. Carter, 294 F.3d 978,
981 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“Lopez is inapposite because there the Court held that
Congress did not make findings that the statute ... substantially affected interstate com-
merce.”), United States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce
Clause challenge to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970), and United States v. Brown, 276
F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to federal drug trafficking
statutes because crimes occurred intrastate and noting that “[t]his view has been soundly
rejected by this circuit as well as every other circuit to address the issue”). In fact, some courts
felt the question of the federal drug laws’ constitutionality was so well-settled that failure to
raise constitutional objections could not serve as a basis for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See United States v. Rigmaiden, No. 08-889, 2009 WL 2370668, at *3-4 (W.D.
La. July 29, 2009) (noting that it was “well-established” that the Commerce Clause authorized
the federal government to criminalize drug offenses, and that an “attorney cannot be
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim”); Thomas v. United States, No. 3:01cr179,
2008 WL 220743, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2008) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel
claim for failure to challenge constitutionality of conviction on drug charges under the
Commerce Clause); Caicedo v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 7619 (LAK), 2003 WL 22681437, at
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2003) (finding that a failure to raise constitutional challenges to
federal drug laws was not ineffective assistance of counsel).
122. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229 (“As applied to the limited class of activities presented by this
case, the CSA does not regulate commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.”).
123. Id. at 1230.
124. Id. at 1231.
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activities subject to regulation and did not automatically immunize
legislation from scrutiny.125
The court then addressed the degree of attenuation between the
use of medical marijuana and the effect on interstate commerce:
The connections in this case are, indeed, attenuated. Presum-
ably, the intrastate cultivation, possession and use of medical
marijuana on the recommendation of a physician could, at the
margins, have an effect on interstate commerce by reducing the
demand for marijuana that is trafficked interstate. It is far from
clear that such an effect would be substantial. The congressional
findings provide no guidance in this respect, as they do not
address the activities at issue in the present case.126
Judge Beam dissented from Judge Pregerson’s opinion because
“[t]hree out of the four Morrison factors favor regulation, and the
conduct in this case is indistinguishable from the conduct at issue
in Wickard v. Filburn.”127 Judge Beam explained that the plaintiffs’
conduct was completely indistinguishable from that of Mr. Filburn
except that the marijuana in Raich was consumed for medicinal, not
nutritional, reasons.128 Under Wickard, he continued, “the CSA
clearly reaches plaintiffs’ activities, even though they grow, or take
delivery of marijuana grown by surrogates, for personal consump-
tion as medicine in the home as permitted by California, but not
federal, law.”129
Even so, he also undertook a review of the challenge in light of
Lopez and Morrison’s factors.130 The application of the CSA to the
conduct here, he concluded, was clearly aimed at economic conduct,
as opposed to the conduct in McCoy and Stewart.131 “Plaintiffs,” he
argued, “are growing and/or using a fungible crop which could be
sold in the marketplace, and which is also being used for medicinal
purposes in place of other drugs which would have to be purchased
125. See id. at 1232 (“First, there is no indication that Congress was considering anything
like the class of activities at issue here when it made its findings.... Second, Morrison counsels
courts to take congressional findings with a grain of salt.”).
126. Id. at 1233.
127. Id. at 1243 (Beam, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1238.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1239.
131. See id. at 1242.
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in the marketplace.”132 Even if it could be characterized as nonecon-
omic because the possession here was “noncommercial,” he conclud-
ed that it was activity that Congress needed to be able to regulate,
lest the aims of the CSA—the elimination of the interstate market
in marijuana and other Schedule I drugs—fail.133
Judge Beam conceded that there was no jurisdictional element
present tying the conduct to interstate commerce and that there
were no congressional findings addressing the use of medical mari-
juana, but was not worried about the latter.134 He also argued that
the arguments for applying the CSA even to local, non-commercial
medical marijuana users was not unduly attenuated, and that “an
evaluation of any attenuation factors favors the CSA’s constitutional-
ity.”135
2. The Anti-Commandeering Principle
First in New York v. United States,136 and then again in Printz v.
United States,137 the Supreme Court articulated a structural princi-
ple of federalism that limited Congress’s Article I powers. Congress
could not, the Court in New York held, “commandeer” either state
legislatures or state executive branch officials.138 The Court held
that the “choice” Congress gave states—either to pass legislation
dealing with the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated
within its borders or be forced to take title to it—impermissibly
infringed upon states’ residual sovereignty.139 In Printz, the issue
was whether state and local law enforcement personnel could be
required to conduct background checks of prospective handgun
132. Id. at 1239.
133. Id. at 1241 (“If Congress cannot reach individual narcotic growers, possessors, and
users, its overall statutory scheme will be totally undermined.”).
134. See id. at 1241-42 (“[B]ecause medicinal use is not permitted by federal law, I fail to
see how this is a particularly relevant concern.”).
135. See id. at 1242 (“Congress contemplated individual growers, possessors and users
when it made its findings regarding the CSA. And, in light of the growing interstate com-
munity of medicinal marijuana users, the attenuation is not great, even, perhaps, nonexistent.
Accordingly, an evaluation of any attenuation factor favors the CSA’s constitutionality.”).
136. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
137. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
138. New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
139. See id. at 175-76.
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purchasers until a national instant background check system could
be brought online.140 The Court held that they could not.141
After Printz was decided, the Fourth Circuit heard Condon v.
Reno,142 in which the state of South Carolina argued that application
of the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), a federal law restrict-
ing the sale of personal data collected by departments of motor
vehicles, constituted impermissible commandeering as applied to
the State.143 Specifically, the State argued that, after New York and
Printz, state officials could not be made to comply with the federal
law because doing so would conscript them in the enforcement of a
federal regulatory program.144
Defending the law, the United States argued first that the claim
should fail under Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth-
ority,145 which held that the enforcement of any structural federal-
ism limits on congressional exercise of its commerce power should
be effected through the political, not the judicial, process.146 Its fall-
back position was that the DPPA was distinguishable from the laws
invalidated in New York and Printz.147 The DPPA, the government
argued, required only that the state regulate its behavior, not that
of its citizens.148 The Fourth Circuit rejected the federal govern-
ment’s attempts to distinguish the law.149 It observed that “state
officials must ... administer the DPPA” and that the anti-comman-
deering principle “made it perfectly clear that the Federal Govern-
ment may not require State officials to administer a federal
regulatory program.”150
Returning to the government’s contention that Garcia permitted
Congress to regulate states by subjecting them to laws of general
applicability, the court replied that:
140. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-04.
141. See id. at 935.
142. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
143. See id. at 455.
144. See id. at 459-60. Other scholars have similarly argued that there is tension between
preemption and the anti-commandeering principle. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Globalization and
Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 27-37 (2000).
145. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
146. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 461.
149. See id. at 460.
150. Id.
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[T]he DPPA does not attempt to regulate the disclosure of per-
sonal information contained in all public and private databases,
which would incidentally apply to state motor vehicle records.
Rather, the DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of
information contained in state motor vehicle records. Of course,
there is no private counterpart to a state Department of Motor
Vehicles. Private parties simply do not issue drivers’ licenses or
prohibit the use of unregistered motor vehicles. Thus, rather
than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally
applies to the States, Congress enacted a law that, for all intents
and purposes, applies only to the States.151
Condon v. Reno produced a dissent from Judge Phillips, who ar-
gued that the panel majority had “[p]igeonhol[ed] the Act into one
of two narrow legal constructs that it apparently believe[d] exclu-
sively define[d] the Tenth Amendment’s constraints on federal
power.”152 He thought New York and Printz were easily distinguish-
able because, in the former case, Congress was trying to compel
states to regulate private conduct in a particular way, but in the
latter it was conscripting state executive officials into federal
service.153
To the extent that the DPPA directly regulated states as states,
he continued, neither New York nor Printz revived the former rule
of National League of Cities.154 He further explained that “[s]o long
as it acts within the substantive constraints imposed by the
151. Id. at 461-62. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit. See Pryor v. Reno,
171 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the DPPA violated the Tenth Amend-
ment). Others circuits, however, disagreed. See Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266,
1272-73 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court opinion enjoining DPPA); see also Travis v.
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court decision holding that DPPA
violated the Commerce Clause). In his opinion for a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Many thoughtful people believe that National League of Cities is more faithful
to the original constitutional plan than is Garcia. But our part is to apply the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as we find it. Indeed, for reasons we have dis-
cussed, Wisconsin’s position would be doubtful even if National League of Cities
were resurrected.
Id.
152. Condon, 155 F.3d at 465 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 466-68.
154. See id. at 469 (“[T]he majority’s suggestion that Congress lacks authority to regulate
‘States as States’ ... simply ha[d] no current force.”).
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Constitution, [Congress] may direct or forbid the states to do any
number of things by either fully or partially exercising its funda-
mental power of preemption.”155
3. Affirmative Action
In both City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.156 and Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,157 the Court signaled a renewed skepticism
about the constitutionality of race-based preferences. In J. A. Cro-
son, the Court invalidated a quota for minority contractors because
it found the City had presented insufficient evidence to justify, as a
remedial measure, the preferences granted to a number of racial
minorities.158 The plan further failed to be narrowly tailored, the
Court concluded, because (1) “there does not appear to have been
any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase
minority business participation in city contracting,” and (2) “the
30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except
perhaps outright racial balancing.”159
Six years later, in Adarand, the Court overruled Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC160 and held that strict scrutiny was the proper
standard of review even for federal race-based preferences.161
Because equal protection was an individual, not a group, right, the
Court concluded “that all governmental action based on race ...
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection ... has not been infringed.”162
155. Id.
156. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
157. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
158. See J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 499-500 (“The 30% quota cannot in any realistic
sense be tied to any injury suffered by anyone.... There is nothing approaching a prima facie
case of a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction in-
dustry.”).
159. Id. at 507.
160. 497 U.S. 547, 563-65 (1990) (ruling that “benign” racial preferences prescribed by
Congress were entitled to deference and should be evaluated using intermediate, not strict,
scrutiny in light of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
161. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
162. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Metro Broadcasting’s holding was an outlier, the Court decided, and
thus had to be discarded.163
J. A. Croson and Adarand called into question the continued
viability of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke164—
especially Justice Powell’s opinion, which had been understood to
permit the use of race as a factor among many in university
admissions.165 Cases soon made their way through the courts,
including one brought by an unsuccessful applicant to the Univer-
sity of Texas’s law school.166
Cheryl Hopwood applied to Texas’s law school and was rejected.167
Under the admissions procedures at the time, Black and Hispanic
applicants were considered separately from other applicants and
were admitted with lower test scores.168 This enabled the law school
“to meet an ‘aspiration’ of admitting a class consisting of 10%
Mexican Americans and 5% blacks, proportions roughly comparable
to the percentages of those races graduating from Texas colleges.”169
Hopwood claimed this use of race violated the Equal Protection
Clause;170 the Fifth Circuit agreed.171
The court stated that Texas would have to demonstrate that its
use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental
163. See id. at 226-27.
164. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
165. Id. at 317 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Contemporary commentary assumed that
Powell’s opinion was controlling, and thus binding on the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), 110 HARV. L. REV. 775, 778
(1997) (“The Fifth Circuit’s claim that Justice Powell’s position was ‘implicitly rejected’ by the
four Justices who would have upheld the California quota system is clearly mistaken.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors of My
Death Have Been Exaggerated: Hopwood’s Error in “Discarding”  Bakke, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 391,
397, 400 (1999); Laura C. Scanlan, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: A Backward Look at Affirmative
Action in Education, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1580, 1583, 1587 (1996).
166. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Thurgood
Marshall Legal Soc’y v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). Other courts similarly concluded that
Justice Powell’s opinion was binding precedent. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741-42
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff ’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Smith v. Univ. Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d
1188, 1200 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (criticizing the Hopwood court for failing to adhere to Bakke)
(“We ... leave it to the Supreme Court to declare that the Bakke rationale regarding university
admissions policies has become moribund, if it has. We will not.”).
167. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 944.
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interest.172 It first considered whether securing student body diver-
sity was a compelling interest.173 Though it acknowledged that Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion in Bakke concluded that it was, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs.174 The court stated:
[A]ny consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell’s
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any
other case. Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions re-
garding education state that non-remedial state interests will
never justify racial classifications. Finally, the classification of
persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frus-
trates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection.175
The Fifth Circuit cited J. A. Croson for the proposition that “there
is essentially only one compelling state interest to justify racial
classifications: remedying past wrongs.”176 It also quoted a portion
of the dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting, in which Justice
O’Connor—for herself and three colleagues—said essentially the
same thing.177 Her dissent, the court claimed, was now vindicated by
Adarand.178 The Court concluded that “[i]n short, there has been no
indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell’s
lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state’s interest in diversity con-
stitutes a compelling justification for governmental race-based
discrimination. Subsequent Supreme Court caselaw strongly sug-
gests, in fact, that it is not.”179
Judge Weiner penned a specially concurring opinion in which he
agreed that the admissions process used failed to satisfy strict scru-
tiny, but he thought the majority went too far in holding that di-
versity could never qualify as a compelling governmental interest.180
172. See id. at 940-41.
173. See id. at 944.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 944-45.
177. See id. at 945.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 962 (Weiner, J., specially concurring).
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His fellow panelists, he wrote, “declare categorically that ‘any
consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purposes
of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment.’”181 While such a reading—which
the panel treated as a straightforward application of binding
precedent—“may well be a defensible extension of recent Supreme
Court precedent,” and may even “prove to be the Court’s position,”
it was for him “both overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition
of this case.”182
Starting from the premise that “[w]e judge best when we judge
least, particularly in controversial matters of high public
interest,”183 Judge Weiner would have regarded the status of the
“definition and application of the compelling interest” test “to be
suspended somewhere in the interstices of constitutional interpre-
tation” because of the uncertain (to him) impact of Adarand on
Bakke.184 He saw no “compelling reason” to go where the Supreme
Court declined, or maybe even feared, to go.185
4. The Second Amendment
In its 2008 Heller decision, the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to own firearms
for self-defense.186 Following Heller—and McDonald, which incorpo-
rated the right through the Fourteenth Amendment187—gun rights
litigants sought to expand the right outside the home. Illinois
prohibited all public carrying of firearms, open or concealed, loaded
181. Id. at 963 (quoting majority opinion at 944).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 962 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831,
931 (5th Cir. 1993) (Wiener, J., dissenting)).
184. Id. at 964-65.
185. See id. at 965.
186. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 602 (2008).
187. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
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or unloaded.188 Its restrictive law was unique among the fifty
states.189
In a surprising opinion, the Seventh Circuit invalidated Illinois’s
broad ban on the public carrying of weapons, holding that the right
to keep and bear arms could not be confined to the home if the self-
defense right recognized in Heller was to be a meaningful one.190 I
say “surprising” not only because many other courts of appeals
rejected calls to expand Heller beyond the confines of the home,191
but also because the author of the opinion, Richard Posner, has been
a persistent, scathing critic of the Heller decision.192
Starting from the premise that the right to self-defense is at the
core of the Second Amendment, Judge Posner reasoned that while
the Court may have held that the right was of particular importance
in the home, it did not mean that it is not of great importance
outside the home.193 In fact, he argued that in the eighteenth cen-
tury, “a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense ...
could not rationally have been limited to the home” because of the
necessity of travel in remote areas populated with “hostile Indi-
ans.”194 He also noted that the use of the word “bear” in the Amend-
ment suggests a right to carry a weapon as well as to possess one.195
Judge Posner considered several arguments offered in support of
the ban: (1) that more guns carried publicly decreased public safety
188. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). Most other states that did
not have laws mandating the issuance of a concealed carry license upon satisfaction of charac-
ter and training requirements did not ban concealed carry outright, but rather empowered
officials to issue or withhold licenses in their discretion. See generally ANDREW JAY MCCLURG
& BRANNON P. DENNING, GUNS AND THE LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND EXPLANATION ch. 5
(2016).
189. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (“Illinois is the only state that maintains a flat ban on
carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home, though many states used to ban carrying
concealed guns outside the home.”).
190. See id. at 942. The panel stayed the decision for 180 days “to allow the Illinois legis-
lature to craft a new gun law that [would] impose reasonable limitations, consistent with the
public safety and the Second Amendment ... on the carrying of guns in public.” Id.
191. See, e.g., Peruta v. San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017); Kachalsky v. Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 100 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied
sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 569 U.S. 918 (2013).
192. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 186-98 (2013).
193. Moore, 702 F.3d at 935-36 (“Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment
right than the right to a gun in one’s home.”).
194. Id. at 936; see also id. at 937 (discussing the modern-day need for protection outside
the home).
195. See id. at 936.
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more than if gun possession were restricted to the home; (2) that
bans on public carrying allow the police to arrest anyone found
carrying a gun; and (3) that public carrying increases crime gen-
erally.196 He rejected each in turn.197 While public carrying might
endanger public safety, it might also “make criminals timid” if they
knew “that many law-abiding citizens are walking the streets
armed.”198 The stop-and-frisk argument was weak, argued Posner,
because “[o]ften the officer will have no suspicion (the gun is con-
cealed, after all).... Many criminals would continue to conceal the
guns they carried, in order to preserve the element of surprise and
avoid the price of a gun permit.”199 As for the relationship between
public carriage of guns and crime generally, Judge Posner concluded
that the empirical evidence failed to demonstrate a strong correla-
tion between allowing the public carrying of weapons and an in-
crease in crime, including assault.200
Judge Posner held that it was not enough to say that Illinois’s ban
on carrying guns in public was not irrational; Heller and McDonald
foreclosed the argument that the state should be given substantial
deference in the regulation of firearms.201 That the Illinois law was
an outlier seemed to factor into the decision as well. “Illinois,” he
wrote, “has lots of options for protecting its people from being shot
without having to eliminate all possibility of armed self-defense in
public.”202 Towards the end of the opinion, he also responded to
judges, like Judge Wilkinson, who urged the lower courts to avoid
the “vast terra incognita” containing all the questions Heller and
McDonald did not answer.203 Posner wrote, “[T]hat ‘vast terra
incognita’ has been opened to judicial exploration by Heller and
McDonald. There is no turning back by the lower federal courts.”204
Judge Williams dissented: “The Supreme Court’s decisions in
Heller and McDonald made clear that persons in the state of Illinois
196. See id. at 937-40.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 937.
199. Id. at 938.
200. See id. at 939 (“In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of allowing the carriage
of guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic defense of the Illinois law.”).
201. See id.
202. Id. at 940.
203. See id. at 942.
204. Id.
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(unless otherwise disqualified) must be allowed to have handguns
in their homes for self-defense.”205 However, he added, “those cases
did not resolve the question in this case—whether the Second
Amendment also requires a state to allow persons to carry ready-to-
use firearms in public for potential self-defense.”206 While conceding
that the majority’s reading of Heller and McDonald is not unreason-
able, for him the question was one that “requires a different an-
alysis from that conducted by the Court in Heller and McDonald.”207
Not only did Judge Williams opine that “[t]he historical inquiry
here is a very different one” than in Heller,208 he was unconvinced
that the right recognized in Heller extended beyond the home.209 He
also observed that an earlier Seventh Circuit decision was appre-
hensive of treating Heller as having potentially broader holdings.
Quoting earlier precedent, he wrote “the Second Amendment creates
individual rights, one of which is keeping operable handguns at
home for self-defense.... Judicial opinions must not be confused with
statutes, and general expressions must be read in light of the
subject under consideration.”210
The language in Heller about the right to carry “in case of
confrontation,” for example, he argued must be read in light of what
he understood to be the Court’s core holding: that individuals have
a right to possess “handguns in the home for self-defense.”211
Finally, he criticized Judge Posner’s reading of the empirical
literature on public gun carrying and Judge Posner’s use of it to
rebut the state’s reasons for banning public carrying. He first com-
mented that the literature was mixed about the effects of concealed
carrying on crime, and noted that “[t]o the extent the majority
opinion’s studies draw different conclusions, the Supreme Court has
made clear that ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence’ does not prevent a finding from being
205. Id. at 943 (Williams, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 946 (“That the Second Amendment speaks of the ‘right of the people to keep and
bear arms’ ... [did] not to [him] imply a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”).
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(upholding federal ban on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants)).
211. Id.
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supported by substantial evidence.”212 Second, he thought Posner’s
application of intermediate scrutiny was inconsistent with the
court’s earlier application of it to the federal ban on gun possession
by persons convicted of domestic violence.213 The ban on public
carrying, unlike the ban on all possession by such persons, should
not require as much evidence to sustain it, since it did not apply to
the core Second Amendment right—the ability to engage in self-
defense in the home—recognized by Heller and McDonald.214
B. Supreme Court Reaction
In each of the instances above, save one, the Supreme Court
retreated somewhat or at least stymied attempts to extend the logic
of its opinions to their limits. The Ninth Circuit’s entertainment of
as-applied challenges to various federal statutes ended when the
Court decided Gonzales v. Raich.215 Reno v. Condon216 reversed the
Fourth Circuit and drew a bright line between preemption and
unconstitutional commandeering.217 And Grutter v. Bollinger218 saw
the Court reject the Hopwood court’s conclusion that Bakke had
been superseded, instead embracing Justice Powell’s opinion and
giving it the majority’s imprimatur.219
1. The Commerce Clause
In his opinion for the six-member majority in Raich (which in-
cluded Justices Kennedy and Scalia, who had joined the Lopez and
Morrison majorities), Justice Stevens wrote:
[T]he activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially econ-
omic.... The CSA ... regulates the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established,
and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate
212. Id. at 952 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997)).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 953.
215. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
216. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
217. See id. at 150-51.
218. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
219. See id. at 325.
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possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational
(and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that
product.220
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to “isolat[e] a
‘separate and distinct’ class of activities ... beyond the reach of feder-
al power, defined as ‘the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, pos-
session and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician and in accordance with state law.’”221 That it
was physician recommended and authorized under state law could
not counteract the preemptive effect of a congressional judgment
that criminalized the production, possession, and sale of marijuana
and declared that marijuana had no recognized medical use.222
Further, the Court noted that because it was fungible, exempting
medical marijuana from federal regulation “will have a significant
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for
marijuana.”223 Justice Stevens found that “Congress could have
rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on the national mar-
ket of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is
unquestionably substantial.”224
The Supreme Court remanded Stewart for reconsideration in light
of Raich.225 On remand, the Ninth Circuit read Raich to “stand[ ] for
the proposition that Congress can ban possession of an object where
it has a rational basis for concluding that object might bleed into the
interstate market and affect supply and demand, especially in an
area where Congress regulates comprehensively.”226 Stewart’s ma-
chine gun, homemade though it may have been, was still subject to
congressional regulation.227
220. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26 (footnote ommitted).
221. Id. at 26.
222. See id. at 27-28.
223. Id. at 30.
224. Id. at 32.
225. See United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2006).
226. Id. at 1076-77.
227. See id. at 1077. No petition for certiorari was filed in McCoy; however, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that Raich effectively overruled it. United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d
750, 756 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o the extent the reasoning employed in McCoy relied on the local
nature of the activity, it has been overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich.”).
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2. The Anti-Commandeering Principle
Reno v. Condon228 reversed the Fourth Circuit and made clear
that there was a distinction between statutory preemption and
commandeering.229 In so doing, the Court made three moves. First,
it accepted the argument that the statute did not apply only to
states because it regulated resale and disclosure of personal infor-
mation by “private persons who have obtained that information
from a state DMV.”230 Second, it held that the information protected
was an article of commerce and comfortably within the regulatory
ambit of the Commerce Clause.231
The Court then finessed the anti-commandeering issue by dis-
tinguishing between congressional regulation of “state activities”
and regulation of the manner in which states regulated “private
parties.”232 Citing South Carolina v. Baker233—a case that predated
the Court’s announcement of the anti-commandeering principle234—
the Court concluded that while compliance with the DPPA “requires
the State’s employees to learn and apply the Act’s substantive
restrictions ... and notes that these activities will consume the
employees’ time and thus the State’s resources,” the DPPA did “not
require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens.... It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to
enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials
to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals.”235
228. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
229. See id. The Court recently discussed this distinction at length in Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479-81 (2018) (invalidating a federal statute pro-
hibiting states from authorizing sports gambling).
230. Reno, 528 U.S. at 146.
231. See id. at 148 (“The United States bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact
that the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a ‘thin[g] in interstate
commerce,’ and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore
a proper subject of congressional regulation.... We agree with the United States’ contention.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
232. See id. at 150.
233. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
234. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 150.
235. Id. at 150-51.
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3. Affirmative Action
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s Hopwood opinion was superseded by
the Court’s embrace of Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger.236 The lower courts had reached different conclusions
under the Marks v. United States237 rule used to identify the por-
tions in a divided opinion that represent controlling precedent.238
Rather than “decid[ing] whether Justice Powell’s opinion [was]
binding under Marks,” the Court simply endorsed its conclusion
“that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions.”239 By doing so, the
Court seemed to treat race-based university admissions as categori-
cally different than racial preferences in government contracting,240
a conclusion that was bolstered by the deferential form of strict
scrutiny that the majority applied.241
The majority stressed that Adarand and J. A. Croson did not limit
the universe of “compelling interests” to remedies for past discrimi-
nation; others could qualify.242 Then surprisingly, in light of its use
of strict scrutiny, the majority deferred to “[t]he Law School’s edu-
cational judgment that ... diversity is essential to its educational
mission.”243 It further held:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in
a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
236. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
237. See 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’”). The Marks rule is easy to articulate, but difficult to apply, as commen-
tators have noted. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 798-800 (2017).
238. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321-22.
239. Id. at 325.
240. See id. at 325-29.
241. See id. at 328-29. The deferential nature of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny
was notable at the time. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 970-80 (2004).
242. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“[W]e have never held that the only governmental use
of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination.”).
243. Id.
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institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a
university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”244
The Court’s solicitude toward the University of Michigan was in
stark contrast to the skepticism expressed about the use of race by
Congress and by the City of Richmond to combat alleged past dis-
crimination.245
The Grutter majority then concluded that the use of race in the
admissions process as part of a holistic review of applicants was
appropriately narrowly tailored.246 In contrast to J. A. Croson, which
sharply criticized Richmond’s failure to explore race neutral means
to boost the percentage of minority contractors bidding on govern-
ment-funded projects,247 Grutter held that “[n]arrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.
Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a
reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”248 It also
denied that the law school’s use of race in seeking a critical mass of
racial minorities functioned as a quota.249
4. The Second Amendment
No petition for certiorari was filed in Moore v. Madigan, and the
Court has declined to review other similar cases.250 Only one other
appeals court panel agreed with Judge Posner that the logic of
Heller dictated that the right to keep and bear arms receive some
protection outside the home.251 That decision, however, was reversed
en banc, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.252
* * * 
244. Id. at 329.
245. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
246. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-38.
247. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
248. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
249. See id. at 335-36.
250. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
251. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d
919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
252. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 923-24.
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In each of the four areas discussed above, the panel majority
purported simply to apply binding precedent to reach a decision.
Like those employees who “work-to-rule” or the L.A. freeway drivers
who scrupulously observed the speed limit during rush hour, the
judges gave the appearance of simply “following the rules.” How-
ever, I argue that embedded in the panel decisions is either a cri-
tique of a recent Supreme Court decision or an attempt to leverage
recent decisions in a way that creates tensions with earlier Supreme
Court decisions so as to force the Court to clarify its doctrinal direc-
tion.253 In the next Part, I make the case that these instances meet
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s criteria for uncivil obedience.
III. THE CASE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF JUDICIAL
UNCIVIL OBEDIENCE 
In this Part, I reexamine Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s criteria for
uncivil obedience and explain why the cases discussed in Part II
satisfy them. In addition, I speculate why uncivil obedience is not
more widespread by reference to the authors’ own identification of
systemic constraints on uncivil obedience. First, though, I offer some
thoughts why uncivil obedience might be a particularly attractive
means by which lower court judges can critique the Supreme Court.
253. See infra Part III.
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A. Why Uncivil Obedience Might Be Particularly Attractive to
Judges
Why might judges—particularly appellate court judges254—find
uncivil obedience an attractive technique for engaging with the
Supreme Court? Uncivil obedience permits dissent from within the
law’s four corners and allows parties who engage in it to overcome
asymmetries in power.255 Those features might make uncivil obedi-
ence especially tempting to lower court judges operating in a hierar-
chical judicial system.
254. My examples have been drawn from the courts of appeals. However, there is also a
district court opinion that might qualify as an uncivilly obedient one. In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court held that majoritarian moral disapproval of same-sex sodomy was not a legitimate
governmental interest and struck down Texas’s law criminalizing that conduct as a due
process violation. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Justice Kennedy wrote:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by reli-
gious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they
aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations
do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the major-
ity may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality
opinion)).
Following that decision, a federal district court upheld an as-applied challenge brought by
persons charged with violating federal obscenity statutes. See United States v. Extreme
Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579-80 (W.D. Pa.), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005). In his
opinion, the judge wrote that “we find that after Lawrence, the government can no longer rely
on the advancement of a moral code i.e., preventing consenting adults from entertaining lewd
or lascivious thoughts, as a legitimate, let alone a compelling, state interest.” Id. at 587.
The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Lawrence did not explicitly overrule earlier
cases upholding federal statutes criminalizing the distribution of obscenity and that argu-
ments otherwise were speculative. See Extreme, 431 F.3d at 161. “For district and appellate
courts in our judicial system, such a determination dictates the result in analogous cases
unless and until the Supreme Court expressly overrules the substance of its decision.
Lawrence v. Texas represents no such definitive step by the Court.” Id. Possible differences
in how uncivil obedience looks like in district courts as opposed to courts of appeal, and
whether the likelihood of reversal by the appellate courts would function as an additional
constraint on its exercise by district court judges, are intriguing questions but are beyond the
scope of this Article. They do, however, suggest fruitful avenues for future inquiry.
255. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 865-68.
40 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:001
“Whereas government service neither selects for nor rewards a
taste for reform-minded law breaking,” Bulman-Pozen and Pozen
write, “uncivil obedience allows office-holders to press dissenting
positions from within the stance of legality that the public expects
of them.”256 This is true of federal judges as well.257 Outright resis-
tance of Supreme Court decisions thought to be wrong-headed is
understood in our system as illegitimate and lawless.258 Likewise,
the Court itself has repeatedly warned lower courts that overruling
precedents is its prerogative, no matter how superseded those deci-
sions may seem in light of more recent cases.259 But “work[ing] to
rule” as it were, reading decisions for all they are worth, can demon-
strate the unintended or untoward consequences of Supreme Court
decisions and can “perform[ ] its own critique” while insulating the
judge from criticism that she is abandoning the rule of law.260
Additionally, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen hypothesized that uncivil
obedience might become a primary vehicle for dissent expressed by
political conservatives.261 Reasoning from evidence suggesting “that
political conservatives value deference to established authority, as
such, more than political liberals do,”262 they argue that “[w]e may
expect to witness a systematic skew in the distribution of conser-
vative dissent in the direction of uncivil obedience.”263 Uncivil obed-
ience “cloaks dissent in behavior that is, at least superficially,
respectful of established authority.... [T]he uncivil obedient
emphasizes the formal legality of her action. Like the civil disobedi-
256. Id. at 866. 
257. See supra Part II.A.
258. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
957 (2005) (“Vertical stare decisis is generally considered absolute.”); Alice Marie Beard,
Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L.
REV. 673, 698 (2014) (“Supreme Court decisions holding that a right is fundamental require
obedience by lower courts if the rule of law is to continue to prevail.”). For a historical account
of the obligation of lower courts to follow and implement decisions of superior courts, see
JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 38-44 (2009).
259. See Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerog-
ative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001)); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
260. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 863.
261. See id. at 869-71.
262. Id. at 869.
263. Id. at 870.
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ent, she is out to change the system, but she does so by mastering
the system’s rules. She does so from the inside.”264
A similar attitude might characterize lower court judges’ rela-
tionships to some Supreme Court decisions. While obviously not all
lower court judges are ideologically conservative, they do tend to be
conservative in one sense—by both training and position within the
judicial hierarchy, they defer to authority.265 If those traits tend to
make uncivil obedience attractive to those who care about appear-
ance and reputation,266 then it stands to reason that uncivil obedi-
ence would show up among at least some federal judges.
B. Uncivil Obedience: A Second Look at the Criteria
Taking a look at the criteria Bulman-Pozen and Pozen employ to
identify genuine acts of uncivil obedience—conscientiousness, com-
municativeness, reformist intent, legality, and legal provoca-
tion267—I argue in this subsection that all are present in the circuit
court opinions discussed above in one form or another.268 The
discussion here will take them slightly out of the order in which
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen present them, proceeding from what I
perceive as the easiest to satisfy (legality) to potentially the most
difficult (legal provocation). In addition, because I think that they
are closely related, I will discuss conscientiousness and reformist
intent together.
1. Legality
Of the five elements, “legality” seems the easiest to satisfy. An
uncivilly obedient judge or panel would purport to be doing nothing
more than taking the Court at its word and applying the decision as
written. Because faithfully applying Supreme Court opinions is
what lower court judges are supposed to do,269 an uncivilly obedient
judge could “reasonably and genuinely believe ... that she is vio-
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
266. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 870.
267. See id. at 820.
268. See infra Parts III.B.1-III.B.4.
269. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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lating no positive law or regulation”270 and that “her behavior truly
conforms to relevant legal norms.”271
Unlike many courts of appeals, which seized on any plausible
distinction between the statutes invalidated in Lopez and Morrison
and those under review in order to sustain the latter,272 the Ninth
Circuit conducted a meticulous analysis using the factors employed
by the Court.273 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit did not simply assume
that the anti-commandeering rule of New York and Printz left ordi-
nary preemption doctrine untouched.274 It instead took seriously the
argument that while a line might exist between constitutionally
unproblematic preemption and impermissible commandeering, the
precise location of that line was not obvious, and the Court left no
clear marker by which courts could distinguish between the two.275
Especially when the law in question seemed aimed at states qua
states, there was no reason to suppose that some forms of “preemp-
tion” could not shade over into forbidden “commandeering.”276 At
least such a conclusion was a plausible reading of the Court’s deci-
sions.
Likewise, the Hopwood court inferred from Adarand and J. A.
Croson that the Court was taking a much tougher line on race-based
preferences, tightening both what counted as a compelling interest
and what satisfied narrow tailoring’s required means-ends fit.277
Finally, Judge Posner argued in Moore that the principles enunci-
ated in Heller could not logically be restricted to the home, if the
Court meant what it said about self-defense and the right to possess
a weapon for use in confrontations to be taken seriously.278 That the
opinions contained at least plausible readings of the Court’s cases
was often confirmed in dissenting or concurring opinions, which
270. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 824.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 1.
273. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119-30 (9th Cir. 2003).
274. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 462, 463 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141
(2000).
275. See id. at 459-61, 463 n.6.
276. See id.
277. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-48 (5th Cir. 1996).
278. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
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usually conceded that the majority’s conclusions did not defy a rea-
sonable reading of the case law.279
2. Conscientiousness and Reformist Intent
“Conscientiousness” requires that uncivilly obedient actors “be
subjectively serious, calculated, and grounded in sincere convic-
tion.”280 While their acts need not be “devoid of self interest,” an act
does not qualify as uncivil obedience “[i]f driven by little more than
a desire for private benefit.”281 Bulman-Pozen and Pozen stress,
though, that “[t]he bar to clear is low.”282 The point of the criterion
is simply to exclude “narrowly commercial or competitive behaviors”
and “instinctive or whimsical behaviors.”283
The opinions above surely meet Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s stan-
dard for conscientiousness. Judges—honest ones, at least—do not
write their opinions for private benefit. Nor do they intend their
opinions to be understood as mere satire, an exercise in the whimsi-
cal, or as an unreasoned emotional outburst. Judges write opinions
to give persuasive reasons that support the judgment rendered—to
demonstrate fidelity to the rule of law, not to indulge some personal
whim.
In addition to evincing a certain sincerity, uncivilly obedient ac-
tors must harbor a “reformist intent”—that is, they must convey
disapproval of the law and “aspire to reshape it in an enduring man-
ner.”284 Disapproval may take different forms. But, “[m]ost basically,
uncivil obedience ... enhance[s] the salience of a regulation or high-
light[s] its objectionable nature.”285 Uncivil obedience, alternatively,
may take a more direct form “by undermining the efficacy or
efficiency of a particular law, policy, or institution.”286 The circuit
court opinions described in Part II, I submit, each adopt the former,
more indirect form of uncivil obedience.
279. See, e.g., Condon, 155 F.3d at 465-67 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
280. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 821.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 822.
285. Id. at 823.
286. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit’s post-Lopez decisions might be read as ex-
pressing opposition to restrictions on the power of Congress to
regulate an integrated, global economy.287 Given the options open to
lower court judges for treading carefully when implementing a new
Supreme Court decision, I cannot help but suspect that Judges
Reinhardt and Pregerson’s Commerce Clause decisions in McCoy288
and Raich289 were intended to signal disapproval of the direction in
which the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was headed. The
decisions aimed to demonstrate that a commitment to that path
entailed limiting the federal government’s ability to prosecute child
pornographers and illegal drug users. Judge Reinhardt, in fact, once
criticized the Court in print for limiting the scope of federal
power.290
The Hopwood panel’s conclusion that the combined effect of J. A.
Croson and Adarand was to diminish the precedential value of
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion seems of a similar piece.291 It could
be read as pressing for the privileging of an antidiscrimination
reading of the Equal Protection Clause over that of anti-subordina-
287. See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003).
288. 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
289. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
290. See Stephen Reinhardt, Millennium Speech (Mar. 4, 2000), in 9 J.L. & POL’Y 435, 436-
37 (2001). Judge Reinhardt wrote:
In the last few years, ... five Justices have invalidated Congressional legislation
in a manner unprecedented since the beginning of the New Deal. They have
done so by severely curtailing the historic scope of the Commerce Clause, by
resurrecting the Tenth Amendment from judicial oblivion, and by shedding their
textualist clothing in order to arrive at a broad-sweeping goal-oriented miscon-
struction of the Eleventh Amendment. From the time that Franklin Roosevelt
threatened to pack the Court in 1936, until 1992—a period of fifty-six years—on
only one occasion did the Supreme Court strike down a statute on the basis that
Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority. That one occasion was in
1976 when Justice Rehnquist briefly assembled a temporary five-member major-
ity for a decision that was later overruled. Between 1992 and February 2000,
however, the Court has held nine congressional statutes unconstitutional, either
in whole or in part, with seven of those nine cases decided by the same 5-4 split.
By the end of the summer, the Supreme Court has promised to tell us whether
three other important statutes, including the Violence Against Women Act, can
survive the acid bath of its federalism jurisprudence. My suggestion is: don’t
hold your breath—but do recognize that the crisis is real and that, if it continues
unchecked, it will drastically alter the fundamental nature of the American gov-
ernment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
291. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996).
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tion.292 A majority of the panel disapproved of Powell’s decision that
diversity in education constituted a compelling governmental inter-
est and sought to “reshape” the law of affirmative action accord-
ingly.293 The panel was, in fact, quite explicit in its critique of Bakke,
writing that racial classifications employed to increase diversity
“frustrate[d], rather than facilitate[d], the goals of equal protec-
tion.”294 It was likewise supportive of the more recent cases that, to
the court, seemed to underscore the panel’s critique and justify its
declaration that Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion had been super-
seded.295
The Fourth Circuit’s Condon decision was critical of the Court’s
National League of Cities and Garcia line of cases, observing that
“the Court’s jurisprudence ... has not been a model of consistency.”296
By contrast, it detected more firmness and less vacillation in the
Court’s anti-commandeering cases and concluded that line of cases,
not Garcia, applied.297 Implicit in that choice too was a rejection of
the Garcia Court’s call for judges to step back from federalism
controversies and allow the political safeguards to do their work.298
It also seemed motivated by a desire to further the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism project, which sought to reestablish a role for
courts in refereeing vertical federalism disputes.299
Likewise, given Judge Posner’s scathing criticism of Heller and
McDonald, his riposte to other judges who urged courts to leave
open as many questions about the scope of the right to keep and
bear arms as possible—that now the Court opened the door, “[t]here
is no turning back”300—strikes a false note. Surely the avatar of
pragmatic judging could have plotted a more restrained course than
the one taken in Moore, as other courts have.301 His decision seems
calculated to enhance the salience of Heller and McDonald by
292. See id. at 944-46.
293. See id.
294. Id. at 944.
295. See id. at 944-45.
296. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
297. Id. at 459, 465.
298. See id. at 464.
299. See id.
300. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
301. Cf. id. at 941 (comparing Moore with the Second Circuit’s decision in Kachalsky v. Cty.
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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demonstrating how far their logic could extend, leading to a much
broader right than the Court was willing to acknowledge.302 Not
unlike H.L. Mencken, who quipped that “[d]emocracy is the theory
that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get
it good and hard,”303 Judge Posner leaves the Court with a choice:
accept his reading of the Second Amendment, with all of its
expansive possibilities, or narrow Heller and McDonald, possibly
even overruling them.304 His criticism of those decisions leaves little
doubt which course he would prefer the Court to take.
3. Communicativeness
Further, the act of writing a judicial opinion that applies or
extends a Supreme Court decision in a potentially far-reaching, per-
haps surprising, way seems to satisfy the element of communica-
tiveness. Courts draft opinions giving reasons for their decisions;
moreover, as Bulman-Pozen and Pozen conceive of this element, the
judges writing the opinions are not required to be candid about their
efforts to disrupt.305 “If it is well understood,” they write, “that a cer-
tain act represents a conscientious effort to disrupt a law or policy,
then the act may count as uncivil obedience even if the actor herself
denies any disruptive ambition.”306 “[S]ocial meaning,” not “semantic
content,” is what matters.307 Judges are not required to say—and
are unlikely to write opinions that say—“we think this decision is a
bad one that will produce all manner of untoward effects; to
demonstrate how pernicious it is, we are going to apply the Supreme
Court’s announced principle for all it is worth in this case.”
As I explained in the previous paragraphs discussing conscien-
tiousness and reformist intent, when a judge holding strong views
about the scope of Congress’s commerce power or of the wisdom of
recognizing an individual right to keep and bear arms authors an
opinion that invalidates a federal law as having exceeded congres-
sional authority or extends the right to keep and bear arms, it does
302. See id. at 942.
303. H.L. MENCKEN, A LITTLE BOOK IN C MAJOR 19 (1916).
304. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.
305. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 822.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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not leave me with the feeling that the judge suddenly had a road-to-
Damascus conversion moment. That is true especially when other,
less dramatic options were open to that judge. The judges may say
that they are simply applying the law, but there is more than one
way to skin a cat. The judges’ choices in the cases described in Part
II seem calculated to communicate a particular message.308
4. Legal Provocation
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s final element is “legal provocation.”309
In their discussion of this “most distinctive element of uncivil obed-
ience,” they explain in more detail “[h]ow ... adherence to law ...
manage[s] to provoke.”310 The key is to appreciate the gap between
“the official rules and the unofficial customs that coexist in a given
area, or between the letter of the law and its perceived purpose or
spirit, and in the attention that is called to that gap.”311 Further,
they note that provocation “may be especially legible when the act
of uncivil obedience departs not only from social norms and regu-
latory goals, but also from the actor’s immediate interests.”312 When
it does so, “it may therefore be all the more apparent that their law-
abidingness has a critical cast.”313 What is key, however, is that
“provocation ... is always marked by the actor’s unusually intensive,
ostentatious, and self-conscious engagement with the technical
legality of her protest.”314 But this element in particular they regard
as likely lacking in court opinions because even hyper-formalist
ones will not be seen as inflammatory or provocative.315
To qualify as legally provocative, then, the opinions described
above should exhibit one or more of the following characteristics,
according to the authors: (1) a demonstrable gap between the official
rules and unofficial norms of courts of appeals decision-making; (2)
a possible departure from the immediate interests of the opinions’
308. See supra Part II.
309. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 827-41.
310. Id. at 827.
311. Id. (footnote omitted).
312. Id.
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 827-28.
315. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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authors; and (3) a kind of hyper-technical legality that is unusual
and self-conscious.316 I think that one or more of these characteris-
tics exist in each of the cases above and that each would indeed
meet Bulman-Pozen and Pozen’s criteria of legal provocation.
a. Violation of Unofficial Norms
We know from studies of courts of appeals that dissent rates are
very low,317 a phenomenon that has been attributed to a widespread
norm of collegiality and consensus in the courts of appeals.318 One
of the first things to note about the cases discussed above is that the
majority opinion in each was provocative in a literal sense—the
opinions provoked a colleague to abandon the norm of consensus
and file a dissenting opinion.319
There is also the norm among courts of appeals, as members of a
hierarchical judicial system that are subordinate to the Supreme
Court and bound by its precedents, that those inferior courts are not
free to “underrule” the Court.320 The Supreme Court itself has ex-
plicitly stated this on occasion, writing in one case that “only this
Court may overrule one of its precedents.”321 In the Hopwood case,
the Fifth Circuit explicitly flouted that norm.322
316. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 827-31.
317. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 159-60 (2007)
(noting that dissent rates are “low,” and discussing theories why the rate is relatively low);
see also FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 227-28 (1994)
(“[W]e judges are well advised to resist the temptation [to dissent] unless we find a compelling
interest and no more effective alternative ... [such as] [w]hen the dissenter feels that a serious
mistake of law has been made on a significant issue that is likely to recur.”).
318. See COFFIN, supra note 317, at 213-29 (discussing collegiality); Harry T. Edwards, The
Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003).
319. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943-54 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams. J., dis-
senting). Or, in Hopwood, Judge Weiner wrote a special concurrence that rejected much of the
panel’s reasoning while nevertheless joining its judgment. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
962 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring).
320. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
321. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per
curiam). For a thorough consideration of arguments for and against this norm, see generally
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817 (1994). For arguments that courts are not obligated to follow superior court prece-
dent, see generally Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1987) and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some
Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33 (1989).
322. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
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Finally, as Glenn Reynolds’s and my readings of lower court inter-
pretations of Lopez and Heller suggest,323 there is a norm among
courts of appeals to read narrowly highly salient, potentially disrup-
tive Supreme Court decisions, at least absent signals from the Court
that it is inviting robust application.324 In each of the cases discus-
sed above, other courts of appeals hearing similar challenges tended
to uphold the child pornography statute,325 the federal ban on
machine guns,326 the CSA,327 the DPPA,328 and limits on the public
carrying of firearms.329
b. Departure from Self-Interest
Scholars have posited that judges (like the rest of us) are self-
interest maximizers.330 Others have suggested that, within bounded
limits, judges seek to advance their policy preferences.331 We also
know that lower court judges tend not to like to be reversed.332
323. See generally Denning & Reynolds, supra note 72; Reynolds & Denning, supra note
1.
324. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 1186 (discussing phenomenon of “reciprocal legitimation”
between lower courts and the United States Supreme Court).
325. See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
326. See United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, vacated, and
remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
327. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub. nom. Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
328. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
329. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012).
330. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
331. The strongest claims regarding judges’ pursuit of policy goals are made by proponents
of the attitudinal model of adjudication. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-73 (1993). But see CROSS, supra note 317,
at 67 (“There is ample empirical evidence ... that legal rules matter in determining judicial
outcomes.... [B]eyond ideological influences, legal rules of procedure matter greatly in deter-
mining outcomes.”).
332. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994). Caminker writes:
Much anecdotal evidence suggests that lower court judges dislike being reversed
on appeal. Reasons include: (1) fear that their professional audience, including
colleagues, practitioners, and scholars, will disrespect their legal judgments or
abilities; (2) fear that a high reversal rate might reduce opportunities for
professional recognition and advancement (including promotion to a higher court
or appointment to judicial or other commissions); and (3) the perception that
reversal undercuts their de facto judicial power, both in a tangible and
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Again, each of the cases discussed above seems to represent a self-
conscious departure from self-interest on the part of the majority.
For one thing, handing challengers a victory will produce similar
challenges. Given the already heavy caseloads of courts of appeals333
and the use of the Commerce Clause as the source of much federal
law (especially federal criminal law), Glenn Reynolds and I specu-
lated that the potential volume of challenges by criminal defendants
alone was enough to cause judges to seek ways to narrow Lopez.334
And yet, by seeming to take Lopez seriously, the Ninth Circuit all
but invited additional facial and as-applied challenges, which in fact
were forthcoming. Had Hopwood stood,335 the Fifth Circuit would
have found itself ground zero for anti-affirmative action litigation.
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit’s broad application of the anti-com-
mandeering principle336 would—had it stood—have likely rendered
that court a magnet for similar cases. And the Seventh Circuit’s
invalidation of Illinois’s absolute ban on the carrying of guns in
public337 ensured that whatever scheme for public carrying Illinois
developed would itself be the subject of additional Second Amend-
ment litigation.338 That litigation has only recently ended.339
There is strong evidence, moreover, that the McCoy and Raich
holdings directly contradicted the policy preferences of Judges Rein-
hardt and Pregerson. Judge Reinhardt, as noted, was a vocal critic
of the Rehnquist Court’s campaign to limit the reach of federal pow-
er by placing limits on the Commerce Clause.340 Judges Pregerson
intangible sense. The understandable desire to avoid such psychological and pro-
fessional costs might well influence inferior court judges to decide cases in
accord with their expectations about appellate court behavior. A judge may, for
example, interpret ambiguous precedents or fill the gaps therein or apply
precedents to new fact patterns in the manner she believes her reviewing court
will do.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
333. In 2017, for example, there were 58,951 filings in the twelve circuit courts of appeal.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2017, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2017 [https://perma.cc/8AD9-57FA].
334. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 72, at 1302-04.
335. See generally 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
336. See generally Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
337. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
338. See, e.g., Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 843 (2017).
339. See Berron, 137 S. Ct. 843 (denying certiorari).
340. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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and Reinhardt were also named in a recent survey as two of the
most “liberal” judges currently serving at the time of the survey.341
The ultimate utility of reductive labels like “liberal” and “conserva-
tive” aside, as a general proposition, more liberal judges tend not to
favor judicially enforced limits on sources of federal power like the
Commerce Clause. And whether one focuses on Judge Posner’s pleas
for pragmatic judging342 or his critiques of Heller and the right to
keep and bear arms,343 expanding that right seems to directly con-
tradict his policy preferences either for a particular style of adjudi-
cation or with regard to the merits of Moore.344
But what of those opinions, like Hopwood and Condon, where it
seems that the judges approve of the Court’s new direction and wish
to see those principles reaffirmed and expanded? In both cases, I
think, one could see the departure from self-interest in that those
panels actively (aggressively in Hopwood) courted reversal, which
judges, as a rule, seek to avoid.345 In Hopwood, the panel practically
begged for reversal by underruling Bakke,346 even though most
courts of appeals thought the Powell opinion was controlling.347
Condon’s stretching of the anti-commandeering principle to encom-
pass garden-variety preemption cases348—especially when plausible
distinctions between the DPPA and the statutes invalidated in New
York and Printz were available349—seemed to seek out the attention
of the Supreme Court. Which it then got, along with a 9-0 rever-
sal.350
341. See Adam Bonica et al., Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 129, 142 (2017) (listing Judge Reinhardt as the second-most liberal, and
Judge Pregerson as the seventh-most liberal, judges on the court of appeals active at the
time). Both have since died.
342. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230-65 (2008).
343. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 192, at 186-95.
344. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
346. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Justice Powell’s view in
Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue.”).
347. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff ’d, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
348. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 456, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141
(2000); see also supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1326-31 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev’d, 171 F.3d
1281 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000) (concluding that the DPPA did not
compel states to regulate and therefore did not run afoul of New York and Printz).
350. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 142-43 (2000); see also supra notes 228-35 and
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c. Self-Conscious Hypertechnical Legality
Early lower court reactions to salient decisions like Lopez or
Heller were cautious. Canvassing lower court opinions in the five
years after Lopez was decided, Glenn Reynolds and I noted a style
in a number of court opinions we termed “Simon Says Lopez,” in
which the case was treated “as almost entirely, or entirely, symbolic:
simply a requirement that Congress ritualistically find a connection
with interstate commerce, however unpersuasive or attenuated that
connection might be.”351 Under such readings, “courts simply ensure
that Congress has used certain magic words in legislation.”352 Many
of these early opinions seized upon any available factual difference
between the Gun Free School Zones Act and whatever law was
being challenged in order to uphold the latter and avoid engaging
with Lopez’s larger implications.353
We noticed a similar tendency in the first slew of Second Amend-
ment cases following the Heller decision.354 Surveying roughly a
year’s worth of litigation following the decision, we wrote:
As was true following Lopez, courts sometimes strain to distin-
guish the challenged law from the one invalidated in Heller, with
courts frequently remarking that this or that challenged law
sweeps much more narrowly than did the District of Columbia’s
ordinance. Similarly, one often sees little analysis—a grudging
acknowledgement of Heller as a new fact of life, quickly followed
by the conclusion that the case did not really change anything.
And while lower courts sometimes lament the lack of clarity in
Heller regarding, say, what the standard of review actually was,
few judges seem interested in figuring it out on their own.355
By contrast, in each of the opinions discussed above the majority
carefully—even meticulously—analyzed the claim, applied what it
took to be the relevant legal principles, distinguished contrary case
accompanying text.
351. Reynolds & Denning, supra note 1, at 379.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 395.
354. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)?
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2009).
355. Id. at 1259 (footnotes omitted).
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law, and attempted to rebut counterarguments (including those
offered by the dissenting judges in each case). The Ninth Circuit’s
Commerce Clause cases—especially McCoy and Raich—carefully
analyzed the statutes in light of each of the factors the Supreme
Court used to determine whether an intrastate activity “substan-
tially affected” interstate commerce.356 The McCoy ruling considered
contrary holdings from other courts and why those opinions were
unpersuasive.357 So it was with the Fourth Circuit’s explanation why
New York and Printz applied (as opposed to the Garcia line of
cases),358 the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of how subsequent Supreme
Court affirmative action cases abjured Bakke,359 and the Seventh
Circuit’s expansion of Heller beyond the four walls of one’s home.360
* * * 
Much like the preacher who, when asked by a member of his con-
gregation whether he believed in infant baptism, replied, “Believe
in it? I seen it done!,” I believe that not only is judicial uncivil
obedience possible, but also that recent examples are readily ap-
parent, if we look for them. Moreover, as argued above, uncivil
obedience might be a particularly attractive method by which lower
court judges can register dissent.361 If that is so, then why don’t we
see more of it? That is the question I take up in the next Section.
C. Why Isn’t Judicial Uncivil Obedience More Common?
In their article, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen discuss several factors
that operate to frustrate attempts at uncivil obedience.362 I suggest
that similar factors tend to constrain judges’ opportunities to be
uncivilly obedient.
356. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229-34 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119-30 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also supra notes 80-95, 121-25 and accompanying text.
357. See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1121-22, 1130-31; see also supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
358. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460-62 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
359. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996).
360. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
361. See supra Part III.A.
362. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 842-59.
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1. Systemic Constraints on Uncivil Obedience
Bulman-Pozen and Pozen identify the following as operating to
constrain attempts at uncivil obedience: (1) the employment of stan-
dards (as opposed to rules);363 (2) transsubstantive doctrines like
“abuse of right,” equity, and preemption;364 and (3) decentralized
dynamics.365
Because standards are “imprecise” and “leave much of their con-
tent to be worked out by enforcers and interpreters on a case-by-
case basis,”366 they are less suited to uncivil obedience than rules, on
which uncivil obedience “thrives.”367 This is because rules’ “rigidity”
offers the opportunity to implement them “in ways that are
consistent with their terms,” thus lawful, “yet insensitive to their
underlying purposes and presuppositions or to the customs of com-
pliance and enforcement that have developed in a given context.”368
An antidote to this—and to the opportunities for uncivil obedi-
ence—is to adopt standards that “allow enforcers and adjudicators
to consider a wider range of facts and factors.”369 Alternatively, one
could adopt standards to complement rules.370
The authors also point to a number of “[t]ranssubstantive [d]oc-
trines” that frustrate uncivil obedience.371 In civil law jurisdictions
and in international law, for example, there is an “abuse of right”
doctrine whereby “conduct that adheres to the plain terms of the law
may nonetheless be treated as unlawful when sufficiently unreason-
able or antisocial—abusive—in some respect.”372 Such a doctrine has
the potential to check uncivil obedience by, say, sanctioning
363. Id. at 842-47.
364. Id. at 847.
365. Id. at 856-59. 
366. Id. at 842.
367. Id. at 843.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 844. Michael Kent and I have argued elsewhere that this is often a feature of
constitutional law, whereby courts develop anti-evasion doctrines that frustrate actors’ ability
to comply formally with a constitutional decision rule in ways that undermine or evade the
constitutional principle the rule was designed to implement. See Denning & Kent, supra note
23, at 1778-79. Evasion, it seems, could be characterized in some instances as a “form[ ] of
rule-conforming incivility.” See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 845.
371. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 847.
372. Id. at 847-48. 
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“[t]axpayers who pay in pennies.”373 The closest analogy in common-
law jurisdictions might be equity, which “supplies common lawyers
with a highly adaptable ‘anti-opportunism device.’”374
Another such doctrine is preemption, particularly forms of im-
plied preemption such as obstacle preemption.375 The latter is often
invoked “when states enact measures that flaunt their superficial
attentiveness to federal law or policy while at the same time at-
tempting to subvert it.”376 Obstacle preemption “parallels the broad-
er strands of abuse-of-right doctrine in its privileging of functional
and purposive considerations, and in the discretion that is conse-
quently afforded to judges.”377 Bulman-Pozen and Pozen offer as a
recent example of this phenomenon the Supreme Court’s invalida-
tion of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which, though “‘mirroring’ the terms of
federal immigration law,” nevertheless was held to undermine the
federal regime and pose obstacles to the achievement of congressio-
nal aims.378
Finally, Bulman-Pozen and Pozen cite “[d]ecentralized [d]ynam-
ics” as a limit on opportunities to engage in uncivil obedience.379
They observe that “uncivil obedience may be subject to more in-
tensive nonlegal regulation in close-knit environments with high
degrees of interaction, information flow, and trust among the
participants.”380 They cite as an example the correlation between the
rise in uncivil obedience regarding Senate procedural rules with the
erosion of norms and folkways that characterized the Senate of the
mid-twentieth century.381 A related consideration is whether the
“cooperation-promoting norms” in a particular setting are “backed
373. Id. at 849.
374. Id. at 851 (quoting Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equality 33
(Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
375. See id. at 853-54.
376. Id. at 854.
377. Id.
378. See id. at 854-55.
379. See id. at 856.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 857-58. For a description of those community norms, and their gradual dis-
placement with a “new Senate style,” see Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirma-
tion Process: Replacing “Despise and Resent” with “Advice and Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 14-25 (2001).
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by effective informal sanctions.”382 Uncivil obedience may be lawful,
but it also might subject those who engage in it to “[i]nformal
sanctions such as retaliation, ridicule, and ostracism.”383 Third, the
“prospects for uncivil obedience,” they write, “will invariably be
shaped by the surrounding legal culture and the criteria for legal
validity that it recognizes.”384
2. Systemic Constraints on Judicial Uncivil Obedience
Similar constraints, I think, operate to frustrate judicial uncivil
obedience. First, because it is “final,” the Court is “infallible”385
when it comes to the construction of its own opinions. It is under no
obligation to press its prior opinions to the limits of their logic.386
Second, the Court can apply its decision rules in ways that produce
particular outcomes.387 Finally, the dynamics of the lower federal
courts and the judges that staff them might mean that judges them-
selves are temperamentally unlikely to engage in uncivil obedience,
save for a few provocateurs.388
Because the Court sits atop the judicial hierarchy and can, if it
chooses to, have the last word389 on questions of constitutional law,
the Court can recharacterize its prior cases, create exceptions and
carve-outs, or simply (if not always ingenuously) say “we didn’t
mean that; you misunderstood our opinion.” In other words, nothing
obligates the Court to accept lower courts’ readings of its cases;
nothing obligates it to press the logic of those opinions to their
382. See Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 23, at 858.
383. Id.
384. Id. 
385. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
(“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
386. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s steps to retreat from the
extension of its logic).
387. See, e.g., Denning & Kent, supra note 23, at 1808 (citing Lawrence v. Texas and Grut-
ter v. Bollinger as examples of cases where the Court applied its decision rules in ways to
produce a different outcome than would otherwise be expected).
388. See supra Part III.A.
389. This assumes that Article V amendments to overturn Supreme Court decisions will
remain all but nonexistent. Nevertheless, the Article V amendment process remains a poten-
tial check on the power of the Supreme Court. For a discussion of the value of the process as
such a check, see generally Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitu-
tional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247 (2002).
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limits. Had it wished, it could have said, “Judge Posner misread our
opinions in Heller and McDonald. The core of the Second Amend-
ment’s right to keep and bear arms is the right to have arms for self-
defense in the home and does not extend to the keeping and bearing
of arms in public.”390
A related power possessed by the Court is the power to put a
thumb on the scales when it applies decision rules created in other
cases to produce results that differ from that which an honest
application of the rules would seem to dictate. For example, com-
mentators have observed that application of strict scrutiny in
Grutter was noticeably more deferential than in J. A. Croson.391
Likewise, in Raich, the Court spent little time conducting a careful
analysis of the application of the Controlled Substances Act to
criminalize local, noncommercial marijuana possession using the
factors Lopez and Morrison specified for determining whether
regulated activity “substantially affect[ed]” interstate commerce.392
The Court cited instead to older cases that deferred to congressional
judgment that interstate commerce was affected, at least where a
rational basis existed for Congress’s conclusion.393
Finally, lower federal courts—especially federal courts of ap-
peals—may be just the type of close-knit environment whose decen-
tralized dynamics tend to discourage uncivil obedience. As noted
above, lower court judges tend to look for ways to apply Supreme
Court decisions faithfully, but narrowly, in the face of doctrinal
uncertainty.394 By nature, then, they may not see critique of the
Court’s doctrine as part of their remit. And judges do face informal
sanctions for violating the norms of judging.395 Dissents, for exam-
390. For Judge Posner’s analysis of Heller and McDonald, see supra notes 191-202 and
accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 241, at 977-78, 977 n.165.
392. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-33 (2005).
393. In his opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the respondents’ reliance on Lopez and
Morrison as “myopic,” arguing that they “overlook[ed] the larger context of modern-era
Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases.” Id. at 23. Eschewing the hard look
at congressional power embodied in Lopez and reiterated in Morrison, Justice Stevens framed
the question thus: “In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause,
we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Id. at 22.
394. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
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ple, can be a form of sanction for either unprincipled deviation from
doctrine to achieve a desired policy result396 or, as here, for pressing
aggressive (but plausible) readings of Supreme Court decisions
where a more limited reading is possible. Being overruled by the
Court could be similarly viewed as an informal sanction that judges
tend to seek to avoid.
It may be no coincidence that the judges who write what I have
characterized as uncivilly obedient opinions have reputations of
being particularly outspoken or provocative, like Judge Posner and
the late Judge Reinhardt. Though I cannot prove it, except indi-
rectly, I suspect that the main run of federal circuit court judges are
cautious and small-c-conservative in their approach to doctrine in
the manner of Judge Wilkinson.
CONCLUSION
The claims I make here are fairly modest ones. I do not argue that
lower court judges are frequently or even regularly uncivilly
obedient. I merely argue that judges, too, can be uncivilly obedient,
and that examples exist where judges have manifested uncivil
obedience as defined by Bulman-Pozen and Pozen. If I am correct,
then the existence of judicial uncivil obedience further calls into
question the standard top-down account of judicial hierarchy in
which lower courts dutifully implement the diktats of the United
States Supreme Court. Instead, judicial uncivil obedience—along
with phenomena such as “[n]arrowing ... [p]recedent from [b]elow”397
and “reciprocal legitimation”398 discussed in the Introduction—sug-
gests that a more subtle dialectic exists between the Supreme Court
on the one hand, and the lower federal courts that must implement
its decisions on the other.
396. See generally Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J.
2155 (1998). Cross and Tiller hypothesized that the obedience to legal doctrine was enforced
by “the prospect of a ‘whistleblower’ on the court—that is, the presence of a judge whose policy
preferences differ from the majority’s and who will expose the majority’s manipulation or
disregard of the applicable legal doctrine.” Id. at 2156.
397. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
398. Siegel, supra note 15, at 1186.
